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Mammalian-Transmissible Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Inﬂuenza:
Epidemiological Context
T
here are many uncertainties regarding the potential applica-
bility of epidemiological data from ferrets infected with
laboratory-created highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses to human
publichealth.Theseconcernscanbebetterunderstoodandartic-
ulated when discussed in the context of observational and clinical
data from infections of mammals and humans by unmodiﬁed
“wild-type” H5N1 highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (H5N1
HPAI) viruses, factors which have been largely overlooked or ig-
noredinmostoftheongoingpublicandscientiﬁcdebateoverthis
issue.
Key factors most relevant to the debate include the following:
● Natural or laboratory-induced infections from unmodiﬁed
H5N1HPAIvirusstrainshavebeenreportedformorethan
20 species of mammals, with fatal consequences reported
for humans and least 12 other mammal species, including
ferrets (1).
● Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 HPAI virus has
been documented in at least 5 countries (China, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam), including documented
person-to-person-to-person transmission within family
clusters in Indonesia and Pakistan (2, 3).
● Horizontal transmission of H5N1 HPAI virus between
mammalsofthesamespecieshasbeenexperimentallydem-
onstratedindomesticcats,andprobableinstancesoftrans-
mission between tigers in captive breeding facilities have
been reported (4, 5).
Natural or laboratory infections with H5N1 HPAI virus have
beenreportedforanextremelybroadrangeofothermammaltaxa
(carnivores, ungulates, primates, rodents, and lagomorphs), in-
cludingnumerouswildaswellasdomesticatedspecies.Theavail-
able data indicate that ferrets and other mustelids may have a
higher level of susceptibility to H5N1 HPAI virus infection than
manyothermammaltaxa,asfatalorsevereinfectionsbyunmod-
iﬁedH5N1viruseshavebeendocumentedindomesticatedferret,
mink, and stone marten. Felines are also particularly susceptible
to H5N1 HPAI virus infection, as shown by reports of fatal or
nonfatal infections of the domestic cat, tiger, lion, leopard,
clouded leopard, and Asiatic golden cat (5). Other mammal spe-
cies susceptible to potentially fatal H5N1 HPAI virus infections
includedomesticdog,hamster,rhesusmacaque,cynomolgusma-
caque,palmcivet,redfox,andraccoon.Mammalspeciesthatcan
exhibitasymptomaticornonfatalinfectionsbyH5N1HPAIvirus
include pikas, raccoon, domesticated swine, cattle, donkey, rats,
and rabbits (1).
The exceptionally high fatality rate associated with H5N1
HPAI virus infection among documented human H5N1 HPAI
virus cases is a key driver in the current debate, particularly when
coupled to the known potential for limited human-to-human
transmission of unmodiﬁed H5N1 HPAI virus strains acquired
through exposure to diseased poultry. We are handicapped, how-
ever, by signiﬁcant gaps in our knowledge of the epidemiology of
H5N1 HPAI virus in humans. Despite more than a decade of
clinical experience with human H5N1 “bird ﬂu” outbreaks in 15
countriesonthreecontinents,thereareonlylimiteddataavailable
on the community-level prevalence of mild and asymptomatic
casesofH5N1HPAIvirus(6)infection,andwedonotyetunder-
stand to what degree differences in age-speciﬁc morbidity and
mortality rates in different countries may be artifacts of surveil-
lance intensity, socioeconomic factors, or genetic differences in
the H5N1 strains in circulation (7). Case fatality rates among
WHO-conﬁrmed human cases reported to date range from ap-
proximately35%inEgypt(n163)to50%inVietnam(n122)
and83%inIndonesia(n186).Thefatalityrateamongchildren
10 years old in Egypt is approximately 5%, while the average
fatalityrateforthisagegroupincountriesinAsiahasbeenashigh
as 59% (8, 9).
The potential for increased efﬁciency of respiratory transmis-
sion of the modiﬁed H5N1 viruses in humans is another central
focus of the current debate. Although the normal route of trans-
mission for avian inﬂuenza in nature is gastrointestinal via oral-
fecal infection cycles in water, H5N1 HPAI viruses circulating in
Asiahaveexhibitedchangesconsistentwithashiftinthemodality
of H5N1 virus transmission in poultry from shedding via the
gastrointestinal-oral-fecal mode to respiratory-aerosol modes,
i.e., increased rates of virus shedding from the respiratory tract
and reduced survival times in water (10). Most H5N1 HPAI virus
cases in mammalian carnivores have been linked to the ingestion
of infected poultry or wild birds (5). Although respiratory tract
infectionistypicallycitedasaprobableprimaryrouteofinfection
for humans with H5N1 HPAI virus infections, circumstantial ev-
idence from human cases in Asia suggests that gastrointestinal
infection is a potential route of infection for at least some human
H5N1 HPAI virus cases (11, 12).
The observed broad range of virulence and transmissibility of
unmodiﬁed H5N1 HPAI viruses in humans and other mammals
clearly demonstrates the need for further in-depth ﬁeld and labo-
ratoryepidemiologicalinvestigationstoincreaseourunderstand-
ing of genetic and environmental factors that modulate the trans-
missibility and virulence of H5N1 HPAI viruses in humans and
other mammals.
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